

11-5911

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1959

SECRET

Dear Allen:

In considering the course of the resumed Geneva negotiations with the Soviets, it is apparent that we will be faced with the specific problem of coming to an arrangement which might in fact constitute only a "moratorium" probably for a two to two and a half year period with respect to the status of Berlin. In order to judge intelligently the position the United States Government should take, it will be necessary that we be able to answer the question: "Would the United States and its allies be in a better or worse position to negotiate on Berlin in 1961/2 than in 1959?" In this connection it would be necessary to consider inter alia the effect on the West Berliners and the world generally of allied agreement in 1959 to a two-year, more or less, Berlin moratorium. Would this be regarded as an allied victory or defeat? How would the West Berliners react to the certain prospect of another round on Berlin in 1961/2? The basic decision, however, would probably still have to be made on the basis of the anticipated comparative strengths of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

It appears that because of lack of access to our basic war planning, neither the USIB nor any other existing governmental machinery is competent to tackle this problem.

The Honorable  
Allen W. Dulles,  
Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency.

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(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *State*)

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this problem. It further appears that it will accordingly be necessary to set up a special ad hoc group consisting of appropriate representatives of Defense, CIA, and State if we are to try to come up with any evaluation of this question. Unfortunately, time presses and it would be necessary that this be done on a crash basis. I should have to have such a report in my hands in Geneva by mid-July, even though it might not be as thorough a study as would be ideally desirable.

I should accordingly be grateful if you would immediately designate preferably not more than three officers from the Central Intelligence Agency to join a similar number from the Department of Defense and State in undertaking such a study as a matter of great urgency.

I am sending a similar letter to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Neil McElroy.

For my part I would propose to designate as our principal representative Mr. Hugh Cumming, Director of Intelligence and Research.

Sincerely yours,

*Robert Murphy*

Acting Secretary

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Mr. Dulles:

At Sherman Kent's request, General Cabell called General Hickey of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee and in his absence spoke to General Willard Smith. The purpose of this call was to ask that R. Jack Smith be released until the 15th of July to participate in this study. This was agreed to.

Sherm has advised Gordon Arneson, therefore, that the CIA representatives will be Kent, General Barnes, and R. Jack Smith. According to Sherm our nominees, together with the three from State and four from Defense, have been furnished Gordon Gray at his request, who plans to clear them with the President.

A meeting has been tentatively scheduled at 9 a.m., on Wednesday, 8 July.

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Mr. Parrott:

The Director wants to take this to OCB today. Please point out to Mr. Dulles that on page 2 where it says, "I should have to have such a report in my hands in Geneva by mid-July..." the "I" actually refers to Secretary Herter and not Mr. Murphy. The letter had been prepared for Herter's signature but he got away before he could sign it, so Murphy signed it instead.

Barbara (per JSE)

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